In order to assess possible explanations of the trends described above, we have explored the correlation between (gross) wages and earnings in Industry and Trade and a number of variables that could be expected to prove influential, particularly productivity growth and labour market conditions. The latter in turn may be general, reflected in indicators such as the unemployment rate, 6 or specific to given groups of workers, reflected in the unemployment rates of sub-sets of employees or in sector employment trends.
There are two aspects to be noted at the start of this empirical exploration. First, since simple correlation analysis shows that the moving averages of actual earning rates of change in each sector are strongly correlated with those of contractual wages (the Pearson correlation coefficients are R=0.92 and R=0.89 in Industry and Trade respectively), we have chosen to 5 discuss here the main factors affecting the rates of change of contractual wages. Second, as can be gathered from Figure 5 .1 above, there is a very close correlation between changes in contractual wages in Industry and Trade (R=0.96 for moving averages). This correlation is greater than, and cannot therefore be simply attributed to, correlation with a third factor (such as the general unemployment rate) influencing both variables, and suggests a direct link between the two. Since both are the result of national contracts, this link indicates that there is harmonisation between wage demands or wage concessions made by the parties involved in the two sectors. Both data analysis and historical experience suggest, however, that the industrial sector has played a dominant role in wage determination. As regards the data, the
Pearson correlation coefficient between contractual wages and rates of change in the sector's employees 7 is in fact relatively high in Industry (R=0.7), while it is almost nil in the Trade sector (R=0.03). 8 Together with the very high correlation between wages in Industry and
Trade, this suggests a leading role played by wage setting in Industry (see also Brunello 1996). We can therefore regard industrial wages as our pivot variable, affecting wages and earnings of employees in the business sector as a whole.
(INSERT TABLE 5.1 around here)
Focusing thus on Industry, Table 5 .1 shows the results obtained by regressing the rates of change in real wages in Industry on the rate of change in productivity and employees in the same sector, the general unemployment rate, and two dummies for the years 1979 and 1993-95, three-year moving averages being taken for all the variables. 9 The overall unemployment rate appears to have played the major role in affecting real wages in the 1970-2000 period (a similar influence being found also in the previous decade). 10 As discussed above, changes in industrial employment also play a less important but still significant role. By contrast, changes in productivity have a small and statistically non-significant coefficient, while the 6 1979 dummy has a coefficient of -1.8 and is statistically significant: in that year there was a downward movement in the rate of change in wages not fully accounted for by unemployment and industrial employment trends. After 1977 wages also began to grow less than industrial sector productivity, having grown (on average) more than productivity as from 1969. Another change with respect to previous trends emerges in the early 1990s, namely a fall in contractual real wages for the first time since the 1950s followed by stagnation. Again, the coefficient on the 1993-95 dummy is negative (-1.5), and statistically significant. Such decline in real wages, albeit moderate, is quite a new phenomenon in the post-war period, and calls for enquiry.
Some of the factors discussed are clearly described by the scatter diagram in Figure 5 .3, which illustrates with immediacy the relationship between (moving averages of) unemployment and real wage growth and its changes in 1979 and 1993-95. The diagram also
shows that the relation tends to become non-linear as growth in real wages approaches zero for the well known reason that decreases in real wages are generally difficult to bring about and, if they take place, tend to be very gradual.
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(INSERT FIGURE 5.3 around here)
In the next section we shall look more closely at labour market conditions at those particular junctures. Before that, however, we shall discuss the question of the influence of productivity on real wage trends a little further. In this connection, it is advisable to extend the analysis to the business sector as a whole. Actually, wage increases might not match productivity growth in individual sectors, but productivity gains might be redistributed from workers in sectors with high productivity growth to workers in other sectors, for example owing to a centralised bargaining system ensuring equal wage increases across industries. It is worth examining this point. Productivity growth evidently 'makes room' for wage increases at a given rate of profit, and it has often been argued, on different grounds, that changes in productivity tend to determine changes in real wages. 12 However, since the same effect upon the 'margins' for wage increases arises also from improvements in the terms of trade, we should in fact ascertain whether productivity and terms of trade have played a joint direct role in determining wage trends.
13 
Broader view of labour market conditions
As we have seen, the overall unemployment rate is the most relevant variable affecting real wage changes in Industry as well as in Trade and the private sector as a whole. We have also seen that in 1979 and 1993-94 there were changes in real wages that must be explained by other circumstances besides the variables included in the regression. For reasons that will become clear in this and the next sections, these circumstances had also an influence on subsequent wage and (particularly after 1979) unemployment trends. In this section we shall take into consideration the possible influence of changes in aspects of the labour market not captured by the variables included in the regression, while the following section will examine the broader economic and institutional situation.
There is one aspect of the labour market situation in particular that may have played a role in the changes in industrial relations that took place around 1979, namely, the process of restructuring underway in the large firms, which were at the core of union militancy and action, and where employment was declining (in contrast with the still positive trend for the sector as a whole) and many workers were made temporarily redundant under the CIG (see 
External constraints, macroeconomic policies and institutional changes
Let us thus look first at the social and political situation, the pressure of international competition, and economic policy decisions around the years 1978-79, which facilitated the emergence of policies that to some extent contributed to the increase in unemployment and the reduction in industrial employment in the subsequent years, and of a dramatic change in industrial relations.
The fact that wages begin to grow less than productivity as early as 1978 and that the rate Anti-union practices and individual benefits and premiums became widespread in the following years, 24 while the divisions among the trade unions persisted (as shown by several 'separate agreements' signed by them). As a result of this situation and the rise in unemployment, high real rates of interest and a change in distribution favourable to profits were able to persist. After being negative for most of the seventies and becoming positive in 1981, the long-term real rate of interest rose to 3 per cent in 1983 and 6.5 per cent in 1987.
As regards the period 1992-96 (which marked another change in the trend of real wages as shown in Figure 5 .1), it can be said that the fall in real wages during these years reflects the worsening of the workers' bargaining position during the 1980s as a result of the social and political factors mentioned above and the increase in the average rate of unemployment (which rose to 10 per cent). Other factors also appear to have been relevant, however.
The 1992 devaluation of the lira occurred after the fixed exchange rate regime in 1988-92 (Italy's adherence to the 'narrow band' of the European Monetary System) designed to discipline wage bargaining (Pivetti 1999). As is known, the regime proved only partially successful in this regard. On the one hand, there was a growing gap with respect to France and Germany in the rate of change in the unit labour costs of the private sector, arising both from a recovery of money wages in 1989-91 (fostered by a cyclical increase in industrial employment) and from lower productivity growth than in other countries (see Table 5 
Some final remarks
We shall now summarise our main results, comment briefly on some of these, and indicate some open questions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the primary factor affecting real wage trends in Italy in Rothschild 1993: 129-30) . It is, however, interesting that the relationship holds for real wages, since it suggests that changes in the bargaining position of workers related to labour market conditions affected distribution, despite the ability of employers to respond to money wage increases with price inflation, at least in some phases. 27 In general, however, we do not believe that quantitative relations should be sought for predictive purposes (i.e. to predict the rate of change of wages associated with particular values of the unemployment rate or other variables). The shape and position of such a relation actually depend on the broader institutional and economic setting and are bound to change when changes take place in the latter. Moreover, such changes in the broader context may be triggered by changes in unemployment itself. Generally speaking, one would not expect the effect of the unemployment rate on the growth of real wages to be independent of the previous path of these and other relevant variables. 28 In addition to this, great care should of course be taken not to generalise from a relation found to hold in Italy over a certain period, which may not hold in different countries or different periods. Further investigation in this direction should contribute to a better understanding of the channels through which unemployment may actually affect wage determination in specific institutional settings.
Having said that, we believe that the strong correlation we have found between average values of the unemployment rate and real wage growth is an interesting result of our work.
As regards Italy, it actually contradicts the apparently widespread view that wages are not affected by unemployment levels, which is probably based on the results of some crossregional studies.
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An independent role for political and institutional factors? It has been maintained that institutional factors play no role in real wage trends in the very long run because the latter must reflect the underlying forces of 'supply and demand' (see for example Phelps-Brown 1968, and Levrero 1999, for critical discussion). Apart from the theoretical difference between the traditional view (shared by Phelps-Brown) and our approach as regards the way in which labour market conditions and institutional factors affect wages, our study suggests that such an independent role was played in Italy, for example, by the broad political and union situation in the years between 1976-79 and that the effects of the changed institutional context and political climate were largely felt in the following years through the high unemployment generated by unconditional adherence to the EMS, the 19 more restrictive approach in fiscal and monetary policy, and industrial restructuring. This is in agreement with a stream of contributions, mainly from political scientists, maintaining that political factors affect unemployment levels and income distribution (Higgs 1977 , Alt 1985 . But the case of Italy also appears to lend support to Korpi's (1991) warning that, while the political context is a very relevant factor, a number of political and institutional circumstances must be taken into account in addition to the political orientation of government parties. 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 trade industry 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Real Gross Wages, Industry Real Net Wages, Industry 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1979-2001 1979-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 5 Notice also that the increasing weight of contributions and income tax on labour incomes was not compensated by greater social expenditure or structural changes in the Italian fiscal system towards higher de facto progressiveness. Social expenditure in real terms has stagnated in the last decade in particular, and there has been a worsening of the tax-benefit position for workers.
In spite of rising fiscal pressure (attenuated after 1998, but more to the advantage of employers than employees) there has been a tendency to reduce the progressive nature of the tax system, and the real social expenditure index increased only from 100 in 1990 to 117,2 in 1999, having doubled every decade during the 1960s and the 1970s (OECD 1985 , EUROSTAT 2000 . 6 Activity rates and employment rates are also interesting indicators of labour market conditions given their ability to pinpoint changes in disguised rather than explicit unemployment.
Systematic use has not been made of these indicators due to some breaks in the statistical series. 7 We have chosen to measure employment in 'heads' here because the relevant point for the bargaining strength of the parties involved appears to be the number of actual people getting or losing jobs (rather than the total hours worked). The drawback of this measurement is that it is gross of workers temporarily made redundant under the CIG (a national fund financed by the state and by contributions of employers and employees: the workers made redundant maintain their employment relationship and receive a subsidy). 17 Limited duration contracts (including collaborations) entail as a rule lower contributions and in some instances also lower pay. Immigrant workers tend to be paid between 5 and 10 per cent less than the Italians, after controlling for worker and job characteristics (Brandolini et al 2003) .
18 In a difficult political climate, the Communist Party put pressure on the CGIL between 1977 and the first part of 1979 to accept wage moderation and gave its 'external' backing to the 28 It is very common in the literature to describe 'shifts' that remain largely unexplained in some functional relations (for example the traditional Phillips curve, or the pseudo demand and supply curves). Our position can be regarded as assuming that 'shifts' in empirical relations are only to be expected because wages are affected by changes in the institutional framework, but the causes of the 'shifts' should be explained as much as possible and not left outside the realm of economic analysis.
